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INTRODUCTION

The trade-and-environment controversy continues to simmer, with
the pot boiling over at fairly frequent intervals. For example, the first
dispute settlement panel convened under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has just concluded that the treatment of
foreign refiners in a federal regulation designed to protect air quality
through the use of reformulated gasoline contravenes the United States'
obligations under WTO rules.' A recent amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal that would ban exports of hazardous wastes
from industrialized to developing countries has provoked substantial

*
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1. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc.
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 17, 1996).
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controversy. 2 The executive branch recently announced that it will
challenge, in the WTO, the European Union's (EU's) ban on meat produced from animals treated with growth hormones as a non-tariff barrier
to trade.
The four books examined in this review reflect the intense interest
in the trade-and-environment connection oVerthe past several years. The
trade-and-environment debate has a number of unique features that have
attracted these authors and others. Both trade and environmental policies
are intended to improve human welfare. With no "black hats," the tradeand-environment nexus presents more nuances than the popular paradigm of free trader versus self-serving protectionist or the familiar
model of environmentalist pitted against greedy polluters. The observation that the ongoing public dialogue over trade and the environment
involves a conflict of cultures has already become' a clich6. But the
readily discernible clash between international regimes raises intellectual
questions of sufficient sophistication to attract writers as distinguished as
the authors of each of these books.
Although these authors represent a' variety of disciplines, all of
them, consistent with:the demands of the subject matter, recognize'the
need to adopt an integrated approach that spans narrowly defined specialties. Daniel Esty, a lawyer and former high-ranking official in the
Environmental Protection Agency during the Bush administration,
consciously introduces an economic perspective. This book is very
thorough, surveying every nook and cranny'of the trade-and-environment landscape. The author purposely adopts a policy-based and
reformist approach. Each of the analytical chapters in the latter portion
of the book concludes with a multiplicity of micro- and macro-level
recommendations for policy change.
C. Ford Runge, an economist, wrote his work based on insights
gained as co-director of the Trade and Environment Study Group organized under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations during 1992
and 1993. Adopting an approach similar to Esty, Runge synthesizes economic, environmental, and legal analysis in his text. By comparison with
the Esty book, this project is less an attempt at a prescriptive solution,
and more an attempt to articulate an overarching analytical framework for
reconciling conflicts between environmental and international trade
policies. Where Esty's book reads like testimony to a congressional

2. See, e.g., Ban on Waste Exports Outside OECD Pushed Through Basel Treaty Meeting, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 4, 1995).

3. Statement of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Jan. 11,
1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw).
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committee, Runge's effort is more of a "thought experiment" at a lower
level of detail and somewhat higher level of generality.
David Vogel, approaching his project from the perspective of a
political scientist, likewise grapples with the legal, environmental, and
economic features characteristic of the field. In the author's own words,
the main theoretical contribution of this work is a "comparative study of
regulatory policy to that of international political economy."4 The goal
of the book is to demonstrate "how trade liberalization and agreements
to promote it, rather than undermining effective regulatory standards,
have often served to strengthen them."' This author meticulously surveys the historical and factual detail in the field and is particularly
scrupulous in canvassing all points of view. The book contains case
studies of the EU, including the seminal Cassis de Dijon case, the 1947
General Agreement.on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 6 the so-called "tunadolphin" dispute, and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). This book demonstrates the proposition that one can never be
entirely free of a particular disciplinary focus. Readers approaching the
material from a legal perspective will find disconcerting the author's
practice of citing secondary sources, such, as newspaper stories, as
authority for governmental actions.
James Cameron, Paul Demaret, and Damien Geradin, the editors of
the two-volume work Trade and the Environment: The Search for
Balance, have assembled an impressive array of authors and documents
covering a wide scope in the trade-and-environment field. In addition to
contributions from each of the editors, the first volume contains essays
from leading GATT legal scholars (John Jackson, Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann), economists (Edward Barbier, David Pearce), law professors
in Europe and the United States (Daniel Esty, Thomas Schoenbaum,
Richard Stewart, and John Usher), and officials from international
institutions such as the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (Christoph Bail, Luc Gyselen, and Alke Schmidt). The
remaining contributions in this nineteen-essay volume are written by
several legal associates at Cameron's home institution, the British-based
Foundation for International Law and Development (FIELD). The very
useful second volume is a documentary supplement containing several
of the most important primary sources relevant to 'this area of study. The

4.

DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A

GLOBAL ECONOMY

1 (1995).

5. Id. at 3.
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 (Jan. 12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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collection includes significant GATT and NAFTA documents, texts of
selected international environmental agreements, and a variety of EU
and United States court decisions.
The first volume of this set explores the trade-and-environment
relationship from the experiences within the GATT (now WTO), the
EU, the United States, and the NAFTA. The first section, "Trade and
the Environment in the GATT Context," suffers somewhat from the
tendency of many of the authors to recycle their views from previous
efforts and an unnecessarily protracted analysis and criticism of the
1991 tuna-dolphin dispute. Still, the careful reader is rewarded with
several interesting perspectives on the trade-and-environment policy
linkage. In particular, the second section of the volume, "Trade and the
Environment in the European Community Context," provides a welcome
European viewpoint of these issues that is too often neglected in North
America. Regrettably, with a few exceptions, little effort is made to
compare the approaches taken in the GATT, the NAFTA, the EU, and
the United States with one another. Instead, each region or agreement's
experience is often presented in isolation, a gap that might have been
closed through a somewhat more active posture on the part of the editors. As it is, an intriguing opportunity to explore the potential transferability of lessons learned in each regime's trade-and-environment practice is inadequately pursued or missed entirely. The volume betrays
evidence of hasty editing, and there is no index.
Not surprisingly, there is considerable common ground among these
works. Each contains thoughtful reflections on the ongoing trade-andenvironment dialogue. All traverse ground that is now reasonably welltrodden and clearly defined from the point of view of analytical discourse and real-world policy making: public participation in trade agreement dispute resolution processes, the interaction of trade-based regimes
with multilateral environmental agreements, and the like. Instead of
revisiting these themes, this review attempts to evaluate the contributions of these four books on a number of the major questions now
outstanding in the trade-and-environment dialogue: (1) the potential
abuse of environmental regulations for protectionist purposes; (2)
unilateralism versus multilateralism in the use of trade measures to
achieve environmental goals; (3) the appropriate linkages, if any, between the establishment of environmental and international trade policies; (4) institutional questions on the international level; and (5) an
overarching perspective on the trade-and-environment debate.
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NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND UNILATERAL ACTIONS

One of the issues that has bedeviled many of those working in the
trade-and-environment area is how to distinguish a legitimate environmental or public health measure from protectionism wrapped in environmental garb. While this question has attracted the attention of many,
the extent of the problem is still far from clear. For instance, at the time
of the negotiation of the NAFTA,7 there appear to have been no cases in
which any of the three NAFTA countries had abused measures designed
to protect human health in a way that could plausibly be characterized
as a non-tariff barrier to trade.
The authors adopt a variety of approaches to this issue, one of the
core dilemmas of the trade-and-environment problem. The emphasis
among these writers is on articulating tests for distinguishing legitimate
environmental measures from protectionism masquerading as environmental regulation. As a general matter, these efforts, all of which are
unsatisfying to some degree, demonstrate the complexity of crafting
generic rules to address a potentially enormous variety of possible cases.
Esty asserts the need to "rebalance" GATT/WTO rules "to give
greater deference to the judgments of national decision makers about
environmental goals and the means chosen to pursue them."8 He proposes. a three-part test, the first prong of which would measure intent and
effect. One of the obvious problems with such an approach is that
intent, particularly in a democracy, is not necessarily unitary but often
multifarious. The motivation for a national measure may be both protectionist and legitimately environmental, and various legislators may differ
in their individual motivations. 9 David Pearce, in his contribution to
Trade and the Environment, underscores this crucial point by noting that
most environmental measures will contain some form of incidental
"protectionist" element. "Deciding when protection or conservation is
the primary motive could be very difficult."' 0

7. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).

8. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE
135 (1994).
9. See, e.g., United States-Canada Bilateral Panel, In the Matter of Lobsters From
Canada, Panel No. USA 89-1807-01, paras. 9.7.1-9.7.3, 9.9.1 (May 25, 1990) (minority report
reaching application of Article XX(g), incorporated by reference into Article 1201 of United
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, concluding that challenged measure was at least in part
trade-protective, and therefore not "primarily aimed at conservation" as required by Article
XX(g)), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Uscfta File.
10. David Pearce, The Greening of the GAT. Some Economic Considerations, in 1
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 20, 28 (James Cameron et al.
eds., 1994) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT].
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Esty's second prong is environmental legitimacy. In this section he
establishes a hierarchy that distinguishes among different cases, depending on the locus of the harm. This question of the use of trade
restrictions to protect the environment outside of a state's jurisdiction is
among the most contentious in the trade-and-environment, relationship.
In descending order of urgency, Esty would first array effects purely
within a country's own jurisdiction, and then transboundary harm originating from abroad but causing harm domestically. Impacts on the
global commons beyond the reach of national jurisdiction would be next
in order of importance, and finally, injuries purely within a foreign
country's jurisdiction."
While this ranking might have some intuitive appeal, it does not
necessarily withstand closer scrutiny. For example, effects. on the global
commons may be a more compelling case for trade measures than are
transboundary harms. In the latter case, all manner of bilateral suasion
not relying on trade measures, such as diplomatic communications, are
available to affect the behavior of the state from which the harm originates, and the "victim" state has every motivation to make ample use of
those existing channels. By contrast, injuries to areas beyond national
jurisdiction are in many ways "orphan" problems, involving perhaps asmuch or more environmental harm, but often lacking a directly affected
constituency that can effectively generate the political will for change.
In all these areas, Esty acknowledges the need for scientific underpinnings to trade measures to prevent environmental harm. However,
adjudicating scientific controversies in a forum such as a WTO dispute
settlement panel is fraught with irreducible difficulties. 2 In the absence
of a clear scientific justification, Esty advocates deference to social
value choices, which he labels "moral judgments," but only those that
"are widely shared, as measured by whether the ethical position at issue
13
is reflected in an international agreement.
As his last prong, Esty urges the adoption of a criterion based on a
measure of unjustified trade disruption. This proposal would consciously
relax the "necessary" test found in Article XX(b) of the GATT, one of
the principal avenues for justifying an environmental measure, and the
particularly rigorous interpretation espoused by some GATT panels that

11. Other writers in this field have adopted a similar matrix for analyzing these situations. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the
Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1351-61 (1992).
12. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA
Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817 (1994).
13. ESTY, supra note 8, ai 120.

Spring 1996]

Trade and the Environment

turns on the trade effect of the measure considered. 14 Instead, Esty
would substitute a requirement similar to the "proportionality" standard
found in EU law. But, as Damien Geradin 5 and Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann 16 point out in Trade and the Environment, this approach,
like many balancing tests, can be quite subjective in practical application. It may also elude attempts at clarification to a high level of predictability and analytical rigor. 17 Interestingly, Petersmann is Convinced
that the EU principle of proportionality places far more rigorous constraints on national environmental regulatory powers than the
GATT/WTO regime does.'"
Where Esty advises a total rethinking of the non-tariff barrier problem, Runge counsels a closer look at the utility of those approaches that
have already been applied. In particular, he endorses the approach of a
panel report produced under the auspices of the United States-Canada
bilateral free trade agreement (CFTA), 9 a precursor to NAFTA, in a
dispute settlement proceeding that otherwise has received limited attention. At issue were Canadian regulations requiring that all commercial
harvests of roe herring and five species of salmon caught in Canadian
waters, including those intended for export from Canada, be off-loaded
or "landed" in Canadian territory. The panel concluded that the effect of

14. E.g., Thailand -

Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,

GATT Doc. No. DS1O/R, paras. 74-81 (Nov. 7, 1990) (import restrictions not justified by

Article XX(b) in light of availability of GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent measures), in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 200, 223-26 (37th Supp. 1991), reprinted in 30 1.L.M.

1122, 1137-39 (1991); cf. United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. No. DS23/R, paras. 5.41-43, 5.52 (June 19, 1992) (measures relating to
import of beer are not the least trade-restrictive and therefore not "necessary" within meaning

of Article XX(d), which exempts "measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with" GATT), in BISD 206, 282-83, 287-88 (39th
Supp. 1993); United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. UJ6439,
paras. 5.25-5.35 (Nov. 7, 1989) (availability of GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent

alternatives implies that challenged measures are not "necessary" under Article XX(d)), in
BISD 345, 392-96 (36th Supp. 1990).
15. Damien Geradin, Balancing Free Trade and Environmental Protection - The Interplay Between the European Court of Justice and the Community Legislator, in I TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 204, 213.
16. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Environmental Protection: The Practice of
GATT and the European Community Compared, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 10, at 147, 176.

17. See, e.g., Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 4632, 1
C.M.L.R. 619, 632 (1989) (concluding that Danish recycling scheme establishing numerical
limitation on beverages that could be sold in unapproved containers was disproportionate to
the environmental objective and therefore inconsistent with Treaty of Rome).
18. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 175.

19. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S.,
102 Stat. 1851, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA].
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the "landing" requirement constituted an impermissible export restriction
contrary to the GATT, the relevant provisions of which were incorporated by reference into the bilateral agreement.2 °
By comparison with Esty's proposed approach, which would "presume the legitimacy of any environmental standards[,]y 21 the panel in

this dispute applied a highly intrusive and demanding slate of criteria
that can only be described as overtly hostile to regulation of environmental problems and natural resources generally. For one, the panel read
into the GATT a new requirement not found in the text of that instrument that would require a balancing of the costs and benefits of the
challenged measure, taking into account the regulatory burdens to foreign commercial interests. Consequently, a panel must determine
"whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that mea22
sure if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure.,
Certainly one can appreciate the panel's sensitivity to the problem of
shifting regulatory burdens to foreign interests that are not represented
in the political process through which those burdens were imposed. But
a cost-benefit test of the sort articulated by this panel has been expressly
rejected in much environmental regulation, including a great deal of
federal legislation in the United States, whose legitimacy from a trade
perspective has never been challenged. Taken to its logical conclusion,
the panel's approach in this report could result in overlaying a costbenefit criterion on all environmental requirements with trade effects clearly an excessively sweeping and blunt-edged instrument.
Similarly, the CFTA Salmon and Herring panel's treatment of scientific questions, an issue identified by Esty and others as one of major
importance, is quite troubling. Apparently without the aid of any expert
advice other than that available among the panelists, the panel concluded
that sampling no more than eighty to ninety percent of the catch, and
not 100 percent as required by the Canadian measure, would be sufficient to achieve its conservation purposes.23 With respect to the question
of scientific uncertainty, the panel opined that "it is never easy to justify

20. United States-Canada Binational Panel, In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No. CDA 89-1807-01, para. 6.13 (Oct. 16,
1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Uscfta File [hereinafter Salmon & Herring panel].
21. ESTY, supra note 8, at 117.
22. Salmon & Herring panel, supra note 20, para. 7.09; cf. para. 7.38 ("[T]he conservation benefits and other advantages that would have been derived from a landing requirement
applicable to 100% of the salmon and herring catch would not have justified its adoption as
a conservation measure.").
23. Id. paras. 7.34, 7.40.
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imposing tangible burdens for the purpose of avoiding uncertain risks. 24
Overall, this report demonstrates little, if any, deference to the resolution
of scientific questions by national regulatory authorities 25 and invites
reexamination of scientific questions before panels in a manner that
would be unthinkable in a proceeding for judicial review on the domestic level.
The reader can sympathize with Runge's desire for a yardstick to
measure environmental regulations alleged to be non-tariff barriers that
is both predictable and a "synthesis of law, economics, and environmental perspectives. 2 6 The result in the CFTA Salmon and Herring
dispute might also have been "correct" in that the measure at issue was
protectionist in intent and effect. However, the larger implications of the
analytical approach adopted by that panel can hardly be regarded as
anything but a source for concern: a highly flawed "synthesis" that gives
grossly excessive weight to economic factors and scientific certainty and
significantly insufficient deference to the determinations of national
decisionmakers. Often the most thoughtful of these writers, Runge
explicitly identifies the need to give due weight to an expressly environmental perspective in the trade-and-environment discourse. 27 Nonetheless, the reader is left wondering whether this author fully appreciates
the long-term consequences of his endorsement of the analytical approach adopted by the panel in the CFTA Salmon and Herring dispute.
Although David Vogel's "primary focus is on the relationship
between trade agreements, treaties, and conflicts and regulatory standards,,28 his approach is more descriptive than prescriptive; this author
does not offer detailed policy recommendations on a level of detail
similar to those of Esty and Runge. Vogel's principal contribution to the
discussion in this area directly addresses the concern that "legitimate"

24. Id. para. 7.37.
25. See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 12, at 845 (criticizing CFTA Salmon and Herring panel

report for
its intrusive review of the exercise of expert scientific judgement by national
regulatory authorities; its lack of deference to science-based decisions of technical-

ly-oriented policy makers; its willingness to substitute the panel's own judgment
for the numerical determinations of governmental experts based on the panel's own
reading of scientific texts; and its relatively limited appreciation of the significance
of scientific uncertainty in the regulatory process, which leads to an adjudicatory
review that is exactly contrary to that prescribed by precautionary approaches.).

26. C.

FORD RUNGE ET AL., FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUEs 80 (1994).
27. Id. at 31-33.
28. VOGEL, supra note 4, at ix.
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environmental constituencies may end up associated, perhaps unwittingly, with protectionist interests. The danger from a trade perspective
inherent in such alliances amounts to an article of faith among supporters of trade liberalization.29
Vogel, applying the label "Baptist-bootlegger coalitions[,]"
analogizes the situation to "the politics of prohibition in the United
States: political support for keeping certain southern counties 'dry' has
come from both Baptists, who favor prohibition on moral grounds, and
bootleggers, whose business depends on keeping alcohol sales illegal. 30
Quite refreshingly and entirely contrary to the received wisdom, Vogel
does not condemn these unholy relationships from a normative or
evaluative point of view. Rather, he acknowledges, at least on this
occasion, that such a convergence of interests is an essential element of
the political and policy engine in which one state adopts a leading role.
Baptist-bootlegger coalitions, he asserts, can operate as a counterweight
to the least-common-denominator effect on national regulatory standards
often cited as a concern about free trade agreements. At least in some
situations, he concludes, "Baptist-bootlegger coalitions can serve to
advance the legitimate interests of both Baptists and bootleggers.'
David Pearce, in his essay in the multiple-author Trade and the
Environment, takes on the politically charged distinction between products, which if contaminated or substandard may be subject to trade
measures under GATT/WTO rules, and the process by which those
products are produced, which is generally thought to be beyond the
reach of import restrictions at the national level. This was one of the
most contentious points in the GATT's so-called "tuna-dolphin" panel
report, which concluded that a United States ban on the import of tuna
caught in a manner that endangers dolphins is contrary to GATT rules.32

29. See, e.g., I CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE '90-'91, at 19-39 (1992) (GATT publication asserting that
"[there is much evidence which points to a serious risk of environmental issues and concerns
being exploited by protectionists for their own benefit." Id. at 21.).
30. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 20.
31. Id. at 261.

32. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GAIT Doc. No. DS21/R (1991),
in BISD 155 (39th Supp. 1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna
Dolphin I Panel Report]. Mexico did not seek the adoption of this report at the time of its
release, and the GATT Council rejected a request by the EU to adopt the report. The EU and
the Netherlands subsequently initiated their own challenge to the secondary import ban, which
is designed to discourage "tuna laundering" by intermediary nations which purchase yellowfin
tuna abroad and export it to the United States. This panel report, like the first, found that the
secondary import prohibition is inconsistent with the United States' obligations pursuant to
the GATT. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS29/R (June
1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Gattpd File (1994).
Neither report was adopted by the GATT Council, which ceased to exist as of the end of
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In criticizing this report, Pearce emphasizes that, from an economic perspective, the GATT distinction between environmental damage arising
from the product and damage arising from its method of production is
an artificial one. Pearce points out that both the product and the method
of production may respectively cause environmental damage in the
33
exporting country and welfare loss in the importing country.
Henry Thaggert, in an insightful intellectual twist on this well-worn
topic, convincingly argues that the GATT/WTO regime currently allows
distinctions in .products based on the methods by which they are produced, specifically in the application of indirect taxes and subsequent
border tax adjustments. He notes that there is no explicit definition of
"like product" in the GATT and that there is ample evidence in the
drafting history to suggest that "otherwise like products may be deemed
'unlike' based upon differences in production[.] '' 34 Thaggert then suggests that the indirect tax precedent indicates that a process-based regulation undertaken in the name of environmental protection should be
acceptable in the GATT/WTO regime so long as that measure does not
afford protection to domestic production. Indeed, many of the authors
represented in Trade and the Environment emphasize that GATT/WTO
dispute settlement panels examining environmental trade measures
should worry less about strictly interpreting the definition of "like
product" and should concentrate instead on whether the trade restriction
in question is applied in a discriminatory, manner that favors domestic
products. Esty similarly advocates a relaxation, if not outright abandonment, of the product-process distinction.3 The level of consensus among
these authors on this important question appears to be sufficiently
widespread that policymakers might well take note.
Unilateralism versus multilateralism represents another, albeit related, line of cleavage in the trade-and-environment colloquy. As pointed
out by John Jackson in his essay in Trade and the Environment, proponents of free trade fear undermining a liberalized international trading
system through the imposition of unilateral standards on foreign societies potentially resulting in a crazy quilt of trade-based restrictions

1995. Hence, these two reports do not represent authoritative interpretations of GATT/WTO
obligations by the contracting parties to the GATT. See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement
in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 94 (1987).

33. Pearce, supra note 10, at 29.
34. Henry L. Thaggert, A Closer Look at the Tuna-Dolphin Case: "Like Products" and
"Extrajurisdictionality" in the Trade and Environment Context, in 1 TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 10, at 69, 72.

35. ESTY, supra note 8, at 134.
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around the globe.36 If the past is any guide, unilateral measures are far
more likely to inspire GATT/WTO dispute settlement challenges than
multilateral environmental protection efforts. Indeed, the first tunadolphin report expressly articulated a preference for multilateral over
unilateral measures,37 and no national measure taken pursuant to a
multilateral environmental agreement has ever been challenged in the
GATT or WTO.
These books also demonstrate that what one person perceives as
unilateralism can well be interpreted as leadership by another. As Esty
correctly notes, "The intrinsic difficulty of multilateral decision making
and the lack of existing institutional structures for effective international
environmental policymaking ... makes unilateral action a necessary, if
unfortunate, policy option in some circumstances. 38 In short, the
GATT/WTO regime provides a skewed, one-sided response to the
current dilemma in most multilateral negotiations: how to overcome the
downward drag of consensus-based processes in which the natural
momentum inevitably tends toward least-common-denominator results.
The authors represented in Trade and the Environment, many of whom
react specifically to the issues identified in the first tuna-dolphin panel
report, are perhaps representative of current thought in this area. In a
welcome development, a majority of those contributors see a need for
greater receptivity on the part of the GATT/WTO regime to unilateral
measures to protect resources of the global commons. James Cameron
and Zen Makuch emphasize that "[t]he importance of multilateral international agreements should not . . . obscure the value of unilateral or
bilateral action. 39
As Henry Thaggert writes, "The fact that a measure is unilaterally
executed should not in itself be the grounds for invalidating it."4 In
Thaggert's view, a state of import that has suffered actual injury to its
domestic environment, the global commons, or a migratory species that
passes through its jurisdiction, and that has imposed certain restrictions
on its own domestic producers of a like good contributing to the environmental damage, should be permitted by GATT/WTO rules to ban

36. John H. Jackson, Greening the GAT: Trade Rules and Environmental Policy, in I
10, at 39, 44.
37. Tuna Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 32, at para. 5.28, BISD at 199-200, 30

TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note

I.L.M. at 1620.
38. ESTY, supra note 8, at 144.
39. James Cameron & Zen Makuch, Implementation of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: InternationalTrade Law Implications, in I TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 116, 120.

40. Thaggert, supra note 34, at 82.

Trade and the Environment

Spring 1996]

import of the product if the process by which the product is produced
contributes to the same damage regulated by the state of import.
Thaggert attaches a useful appendix to his article that proposes the
development of a framework for allowing the imposition of productbased distinctions beyond national borders. In like manner, Demaret, in
one of his essays in Trade and the Environment, supports the use of
trade restrictions to protect the global commons, allowing exceptional
trade measures for species on the verge of extinction, even in the absence of international cooperation.4' Significantly, Petersmann sees few
limitations in GATT/WTO rules on "extrajurisdictional" trade restrictions if foreign production and exports cause transboundary pollution or
injury to the global commons. 42 As with the non-tariff barrier issue, the
scope of the "problem" is less than clear. Unilateral measures to protect
resources outside a state's jurisdiction appear to have been rarely, if
ever, directed at unrelated products except in situations closely tied to
the purpose of a multilateral environmental agreement. But somewhat
soberingly, Christoph Bail notes that the European Commission continues to support the position that a country should not unilaterally restrict
imports on environmental grounds if the damage does not have an
impact in that state's territory.43 In a captivating permutation on the
multilateral/unilateral duality, Cameron and Makuch speculate on the use
of trade measures, particularly carbon dioxide or energy taxes, in the
context of the U.N. Climate Change Convention.' This is a very important contribution because this agreement, unlike others that have assumed importance in the trade-and-environment discourse, does not expressly authorize trade-based environmental measures.
II.

LINKAGES AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Throughout these works, a tug-of-war dynamic between trade realities and environmental concerns is readily discernible. Competing, but
constant, themes alternately strengthen and sever the trade-and-environment connection. Runge's work is a good example of the ebb and flow
of these motifs. He argues for bifurcation in policy tools: "trade targets

41. Paul Demaret, TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT, in I TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 52, 64.

42. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 159.
43. Christoph Bail, The Promotion of Policy Coherence on Trade and Environment: A
Role for the European Community, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at
333, 335.
44. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.TREATY
Doc. No. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 311 L.M. 851 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Climate
Change Convention].
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should be matched with trade instruments, and environmental targets
with environmental instruments."45 On the other hand, Runge repeatedly
emphasizes the need for tightened environmental regulation to offset the
deregulatory effect of trade liberalization.' But the vehicle for achieving
this goal, at least at the international level, would not be an institutional
structure to address the connection between trade and environment, but
a new "World Environmental Organization" (WEO), portrayed as a
vigorous multilateral institution whose mandate is confined to the environment. In a return to the theme of linkage, Runge acknowledges that
trade agreements are inherently deals in which market access is provided
on a consensual basis through the vehicle of a trade agreement. Runge
then emphasizes that there is no reason why the price of market access
should not be improved environmental standards and performance.4 7
These themes are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Far from
representing any confusion on the part of this author or others, each of
these strains, appropriately understood, has a place in a comprehensive
view of the trade-and-environment problem.
It is clear that there is a significant disparity in the primary institutional fora on the international level in which trade- and environmental
matters are considered. Most environmental problems have been treated
on the international level in a segmented, compartmentalized manner.
International environmental agreements are largely separate and uncoordinated attempts to deal with discrete problems like protection of the
stratospheric ozone layer,48 conservation of endangered species,49 and
environmental harm from international shipments of hazardous wastes,5 °
to name three of the areas that have attracted the most attention in a
trade context. Dispute settlement and .enforcement provisions in most
multilateral environmental agreements are weak.
Despite the great activity, in drafting new international environmental
treaties in recent years, the field of international environmental law has

45.

RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 29.
46. Id. at 52.
47. Id. at 27.
48. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (adjusted and
amended June 29, 1990, S. TREATY Doc.-No. 4, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 30 I.L.M. 539
(1991), and Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 32 I.L.M.
875 (1993)).
49. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
50. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991), 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
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not been accompanied by a commensurate level of institutional growth.
The result has been a lack of coordination and a high degree of fragmentation. Only one international organization, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), has a mission that is exclusively environmental. Numerois' otherinternational organizations established for a
variety of other purposes have also played significant roles in international environmental challenges. Some of these organizations include the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), under whose auspices a
number of marine pollution agreements have been negotiated; the U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which has been the vehicle
for negotiating a number of important agreements on traditional air
pollution issues; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which in the pasthas been a principal forum for discussing transboundary pollution and is now working on the trade-andenvironment nexus; and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), which has played a major role in work on pesticides at the
international level. The negotiation of the U.N. Climate Change Convention adopted in 1992 was entrusted to another new body, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). Even more institutional
fragmentation has taken place as the secretariats for environmental
agreements have increasingly acquired an independent character and
have located far from one another.
In contrast, the WTO now serves as a central focal point in the trade
arena with broad-gauge rule-making authority potentially covering the
entire range of trade-related matters, including environmental standards,
intellectual property, and, agricultural subsidies. Bilateral or regional
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, generally rely on fundamental
GATT/WTO principles and are consciously structured to be consistent
with the global regime. The GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms,
which were already quite effective by comparison with those in most
multilateral environmental agreements, were further strengthened by the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral. Trade Negotiations and the creation of
the WTO. Petersmann is particularly perceptive in recognizing these
significant asymmetries between the international trade and environmental regimes.5
Both Runge and Esty strongly and correctly emphasize the need for
more effective environmental rule-making mechanisms on the international level. Esty's "Global Environmental Organization" .(GEO) is
similar to the WEO proposed by Runge. The central need, as both

51. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 147-48.
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recognize, is to overcome the inertial rigidity of an international system
based on consent and consensus.52 The core dilemma is to determine the
attributes of this new organization which, presumably, will respond
effectively to the problems of the past. Runge succeeds somewhat better
than Esty at identifying institutional rules and mechanisms that might
provide some incremental improvements. In the end, both are considerably less than satisfying, which is perhaps inevitable. Even the International Labor Organization (ILO), whose institutional structures still seem
innovative by today's standards, has been only partially successful in
achieving the kind of results Runge and Esty anticipate. It is neither
reasonable nor necessarily desirable to advocate the formation of a
global environmental legislature. Ultimately, as Vogel might opine, the
determinative factor may well be political will and not institutional
mechanisms. As Vogel states in his last sentence, perhaps there is no
escaping that "[iun the final analysis, the impact of trade and trade
agreements on regulatory standards is determined by the interaction of
domestic and international politics."53
Consequently, there is likely to be a continuing need not only to
emphasize the efficacy of environmental regulatory mechanisms, but
also to reassert the connections between international trade and the
environment. The international trade regime has been driven by the
central, overarching goal of liberalizing trade through the systematic
elimination of affirmative governmental measures such as tariffs. Indeed,
the history of the international trade regime since the Second World
War can be seen as incremental but persistent progress in extending this
purpose to include not only tariffs, but export subsidies and non-tariff
barriers as well. The efficacy of the trade regime can be accounted for
to a large extent by the simplicity of this central message: less governmental intervention, almost by definition, promotes liberalized trade. By
contrast, international obligations with respect to the environment, and
many other areas as well, anticipate and require the implementation of
affirmative governmental actions intended to address particular problems. In a microcosm, this explains the recent clash between trade and
the environment. One regime is designed to facilitate the implementation
of affirmative governmental measures while the other is intended to
assure their absence. From the point of view of an environmentallymotivated standard or regulation, the international trade regime as
currently -structured is a no-win proposition. There are no mechanisms

52. ESTY, supra note 8, at 89-95.
53. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 270.
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for assuring the implementation of minimum governmental measures,
and once those policies that do exist are subjected to trade-based scrutiny, nothing more than maintenance of the status quo can be expected in
even the best possible case. As Esty succinctly puts the problem:
The GATT currently is asymmetric. It provides for assessments
that an environmental standard is, in some sense, "too high" and a
burden on trade flows. But no comparable provision exists to allow
a determination that an environmental standard is "too low" and is
burdening other countries with pollution externalities. Such judgments are needed to determine whether a nation is "free riding"
rather than participating in efforts to address transboundary or
global environmental problems and, in doing so, perhaps reducing
its manufacturing costs and obtaining an unfair trade advantage.54
At this point, Vogel enters the colloquy with a provocative and
perhaps counterintuitive thesis: that trade liberalization, of its own force,
"has, on balance, contributed to strengthening national regulatory policies, especially for traded goods and ... for domestic production standards as well. '55 He attributes this to a "California effect":
named for the state that has been on the cutting edge of environmental regulation, both nationally and globally, for nearly three
decades. The California effect refers to the critical role of powerful
and wealthy "green" political jurisdictions in promoting a regulatory "race to the top" among their trading partners.56
Ultimately, however, the analysis is disappointing. Although the author
repeatedly refers to the GATT (now WTO) as a relatively weak institution by comparison with the United States government or the supranational EU, he fails to appreciate the important qualitative distinctions.
The "California effect" arises not from trade liberalization in the
GATT/WTO sense, but as a result of the affirmative regulatory activity
characteristic of a higher degree of structural integration than that found
in most free trade agreements. As Runge would recognize, the "California effect" is dependent on the strength of institutions empowered to
make environmental rules, not those whose mission is to promote trade
liberalization in the deregulatory sense. Nowhere is this clearer than in
Vogel's observation that "[p]aradoxically, the more authority nations
concede over the making of national regulatory standards, the more

54. ESTY, supra note 8, at 232.

55. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 269-70.

56. Id. at 6.
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likely these standards will be strengthened.57 Put somewhat differently,
instead of a dilution of regulatory standards catalyzed by trade liberalization, Vogel envisages a "race to the top" led by those jurisdictions
with higher standards. In cases in which this statement is true, it is not
paradoxical at all, but a phenomenon entirely to -be expected. The effect,
contrary to Vogel's assertion, is not aresult of trade deregulation. Rather, as international institutions acquire more active rule-making powers,
it is that affirmative authority, not the constraints imposed by trade
liberalization, that has the capacity to offset the deregulatory effects of
trade liberalization. 8
For this reason, the WTO and the EU, not to mention a. true federal
state like the United States, are not analogous entities because of the
crucial differences among them. To be fair, many of the authors represented in these books blithely engage in such comparisons' with relatively little appreciation of the profound difference in rules -governing,
for instance, the WTO -on the one hand and the EU on the other. A
number of the authors - particularly Vogel, but also Runge - survey
experiences in the EU, the NAFTA, and the GATTIWTO regime and
draw comparisons based on them. An entire section of Trade and the
Environment is entitled "Trade and the Environment in the European
Community Context." Damien Geradin's detailed analysis in this section
of the trade-and-environment jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice is most useful on those terms. Alke Schmidt contributes a thorough historical survey of the waste trade under EU law, and John Usher
acknowledges the important influence of the EU's external obligations,
such as the Basel Convention, on the extension of the European Union's
competence over member states in the area of environmental policy.
Similarly, Paul Demaret examines the use of trade-related environmental
measures in the EU's external relations. While these topics are fascinating and compelling in their own right, the extent to which the lessons
learned are replicable in other trade-and-environment contexts is far
from clear. To the extent that the editors of and contributors to Trade
and the Environment believe that the GATT/WTO regime may have a
great deal to learn from the EU's experience in settling trade-and-environment disputes, considerably more discussion is needed. Unfortunately, most of the authors leave too many of the potential comparisons
unexplored. Analogies are provided that do not transfer well from the

57. Id. at 264.
58. E.g., Single European Act, 1986 BULL. EUR. COMM. 5, 16-17 (Supp. 2) (adding to
the Treaty of Rome arts. 130(r-s), expressly authorizing affirmative action at EU level with
respect to environment), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 503, 506 (1986).
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GATT/WTO context to the EU and vice versa, and there is an unfortunate tendency to blur institutional and legal distinctions. Petersmann's
contribution59 and Christoph Bail's provocative but all-too-brief piece
are the most perceptive exceptions to this general rule.
Perhaps this says more about the inherent .differences between the
EU and the GATT/WTO regime than it does about the authors' various
well-intentioned efforts. The EU is a supranational institution, admittedly with limited subject matter jurisdiction or "competence," but
certainly with the capacity to establish affirmative rules. By comparison,
the WTO is merely the international equivalent of the "dormant" or
"negative" commerce clause, hardly the basis for a constitutional structure comparable to municipal governments or even regional economic
integration organizations like the EU. Without taking into account these
critical, differences, it is very difficult to compare these international
institutions so as to draw meaningful conclusions. Moreover, an appropriate -analysis suggests that the real problem in the trade-and-environment area is not, as. is often argued, loss of national sovereignty, but
selective cession of sovereignty.
Like Runge, many of the contributors to Trade and the Environment, including Jackson, Esty (in a contribution to the multiple-author
volume), and Thomas Schoenbaum, see promising environmental beginnings in NAFTA's treatment of other multilateral environmental
agreements that employ trade measures, the potential inclusion of environmental expertise on dispute settlement panels, investment
disincentives to discourage the formation of "pollution havens," and the
exhortation to harmonize up, not down. Much more acutely than most of
the other authors, Runge appreciates the role of and need for affirmative
environmental regulation in the context of trade liberalization. Accordingly, he asserts that, in the case of NAFTA, this counterweight was
provided by the so-called "side agreement. ' 6°
Zen Makuch is considerably less impressed with Esty's characterization of NAFTA as the "'greenest' trade agreement ever[.],, 61 Unlike
Runge, who regards the. integrity of that instrument as crucial, Makuch
is highly critical of the NAFTA environmental side agreement. He views
the institution it establishes, theCommission on Environmental Cooperation, as unable to mitigate -or prevent the environmental effects of the

59. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 150-53.
60. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 95-96; see generally North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).
61. Daniel C. Esty, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons
from NAFTA, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 373, 379.
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parent trade agreement due to a series of inherent legal and structural
weaknesses. 2 The Commission's powers, he asserts, are confined to
identifying and drawing attention to environmental problems. 63 Its
arduous enforcement mechanisms and dispute settlement provisions are
additionally encumbered by several procedural hurdles whereby twothirds of the NAFTA parties must concur before the process may continue. Public participation, he believes, is limited and all of the Commission's actions are overseen by the national governments of the NAFTA
parties. 64 Significantly, in light of the emphasis both Runge and Esty
place upon effective decisionmaking procedures in a WEO or GEO,
"[a]ll decisions and recommendations of the Council [of the Commission,
comprised of representatives of the three NAFTA parties] shall be taken
by consensus[.] ' , 65 The Commission may very well be a useful forum for
the NAFTA parties to address environmental challenges of mutual
concern. But as Makuch pointedly emphasizes, the NAFTA side agreement, from a structural point of view, is very unlikely to represent the
sort of institutional progress sufficient to match the rigor of the trade
disciplines set out in the NAFTA proper. The side agreement assigns to
the Commission a large number of highly desirable tasks, such as "pollution prevention techniques and strategies," "transboundary and border
environmental issues, such as the long-range transport of air and marine
pollutants," and "the environmental implications of goods throughout
their life cycles."6 These mandates, however, are quite open-ended and
there is no guarantee that concrete progress will be achieved in any of
these areas. By comparison with the NAFTA proper, which is an edifice
of binding, enforceable obligations, the side agreement at the time of its
adoption was, and remains, merely a preliminary blueprint for a structure
on which construction has yet to commence.
Of all the authors, Runge perhaps best appreciates the horse trading,
deal-making nature of the trade agreement negotiation process and its
implications for the environment. The ultimate trade-and-environment
linkage is environmental performance as a price of market access.
Accordingly, he advocates "offering access to markets in lieu of direct

62. Zen Makuch, The Environmental Implications of the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at

387.
63.
64.
65.
para. 6,

Id. at 405.
Id. at 427.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 60, art. 9,
32 I.L.M. at 1482, 1485.

66. Id. art. 10, paras. 2(b), 2(g), 2(m).
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aid ' 67 and "market access . . . tied to specific attention in the South to
environmental protection and improvements, a kind of 'environmental
conditionality.'" 6 8 These notions are iconoclastic, perhaps particularly so
for an economist. There is, however, a strong precedent. Precisely this
kind of linkage was -a centerpiece of the Uruguay Round, in which
market access was provided in return for improved performance in the
recognition of intellectual property rights. This "deal" produced for the
first time a trade agreement, adopted as part of the Uruguay Round,
containing affirmative requirements for intellectual property protection.69
While environmental regulation is not precisely analogous to intellectual
property rights, a potentially replicable precedent has now been established that could, at least in principle, provide a-basis for, as Esty advocates, affirmatively "greening the GATT."
The various contributors to Trade and the Environment similarly
view questions of linkage on a variety of planes. As John Jackson
writes, "The only questions [sic] is how long the various political pressures for this type of reform will tolerate lack of concrete progress. '"7°
Despite their enthusiasm for improving the ties between the two regimes, many of the authors in this collection urge caution in the development of links between environment and trade. For instance, Jackson
promotes a definitive "interpretation" endorsed by WTO members to
preserve the environmental protection goals in multilateral environmental agreements that utilize trade measures. Simultaneously, he is wary of
eroding the benefits of environmental guidelines such as the polluterpays principle by allowing a potential GATT/WTO exemption for envi-

67. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 26.
68. Id. at 27. The references to foreign aid and conditionality invite analysis of a
different sort of linkage that has been little appreciated. In recent years, the World Bank and
other multilateral and bilateral aid donors have increasingly emphasized environment as a

component of development assistance. To the extent that this "green conditionality" applies to
exports from the recipient country, the prohibition on process standards in the GATT/WTO
regime may very well send a conflicting message to recipient countries. Although develop-

ment assistance is increasingly tied to environmental performance, market access is not.
Indeed, GATT/WTO rules would affirmatively impede any efforts to coordinate incentives by

such international institutions as the World Bank and the WTO. As Runge implicitly recognizes, rules governing trade flows are likely to be far more powerful agents of change in
encouraging improvements in environmental quality than direct aid will ever be. As one of
his multiplicity of recommendations, Esty proposes a "Green Fund" financed by a 1/100 of

one percent tax on trade and capital flows. ESTY, supra note 8, at 239. The performance of
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the extant international institution most closely
related to this proposal, has been sufficiently uneven that it would probably be premature to
replicate that model on the scale envisaged by Esty.
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA I-AIC (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1,4 (1994).
70. Jackson, supra note 36, at 50.
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ronmental subsidies. 71 No fewer than four of the contributions - those
by Pearce, Jackson, Petersmann, and Cameron and Makuch - recommend clarifying the environmental exceptions contained in Article XX
of the GATT.
Institutional issues are treated with a similarly high profile. Writing
prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round, Cameron and Halina Ward
recommend a variety of institutional reforms including increased public
participation, voting restructuring, and changes to the dispute settlement
system, few of which were in fact accepted. In particular, their suggestion for the establishment of an Environmental Impact Committee, under
the auspices of the GATT/WTO, to assist in the development of a
72
methodology to assess the environmental effects of liberalized trade
deserves greater attention in the public policy arena than it appears to
have received.

III. THE BIG PICTURE
The task in addressing the trade-and-environment dialectic, according to each of these books, is to reconcile the conflict between international trade and environmental regimes. The touchstone in each work is
"balance," a word that appears in the title of two of the four books, and
the analytical emphasis is on an accommodation between the two fields.
Esty, whose approach is characteristic of the other books, repeatedly
announces that he is searching for a "middle ground"7 3 or a "middle
course."7 4 Cameron sees in the activities of a variety of international
institutions exploring the trade-and-environment relationship "genuine
hope for the achievement of balance. 7 5 This suggests that what is
required is compromise or "trade-offs ' 7 6 to achieve a welfare-optimizing
equilibrium between these two public policy goals. Defining the problem in this manner inevitably leads to the sort of difficulties and complexities that bamboozle many of these authors when they try to identify
unacceptable environmental regulations, establish tests for unilateral
measures, or parse appropriate institutional roles. There is, however, no
a priori reason to believe that a split-the-difference approach will neces-

71. Id. at 49.
72. James Cameron & Halina Ward, The Multilateral Trade Organisation: A Revised
Perspective, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 96.
73. ESTY, supra note 8, at 41.
74. Id. at 55.
75. James Cameron, Introduction to 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at
14, 14.
76. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 12.
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sadly reach a larger truth. More fundamentally, a perspective that treats
this area merely as a clash of regimes may very well overlook the
deeper dynamics that gave rise to this conflict in the first place. A single
earthquake may very well be evidence of great shifts in tectonic plates.
An alternative approach might avoid asking the question, which
each of these books does either explicitly or implicitly, whether international trade is consistent with environmental protection or vice versa.
Instead, one might consider the role of both international trade and
environmental protection as embedded in the larger public policy goal of
encouraging sustainable development. "Sustainable development" was
the central theme of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), the so-called "Earth Summit" held in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992 and attended by more than 100 heads of state and
government. It was also the theme in the report of the earlier World
Commission on Environment and Development, a group of twenty-one
eminent individuals appointed in their personal capacities and chaired by
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs,77 the content of
"sustainable development" as a concept is somewhat indeterminate.
If
anything is clear, it is that the term is plainly intended as an overarching
construct that encompasses international trade and environmental protection, as well as other compartmentalized public policy goals such as
development assistance. Although all four of these books mention the
Rio Conference, none, with the possible exception of Cameron and
Ward in their essay in Trade and the Environment, ascribe to it a central
role in the trade environment colloquy. Indeed, Vogel treats the event in
a scant paragraph.78
From this point of view, one might ask whether certain environmental protection measures are so inappropriately burdensome that they
unreasonably interfere with the capacity of present generations to meet
their own needs. This is one way of interpreting the non-tariff barrier
problem discussed in Part II above. Similarly, one might identify the
notion of "sustainable trade" as trade that facilitates the efforts of present generations to satisfy their needs while preserving the capacity of
future generations to meet their own needs. Without further elaboration,
the concept of "sustainable trade" thus defined is probably not capable

77. See

EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRON-

MENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 43-45 (1987).
78.

VOGEL,

supra note 4, at 140-41.
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of precise application as a legal test. It does, however, accommodate the
relatively elementary notion that some types of trade can encourage
sustainability, while other kinds of trade might undermine that goal.
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, one of
the principal products of the Uruguay Round, refers to "optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development[.] ' '79 Despite this recitation and the encouragement of
Cameron and Ward to make the international trading system truly
supportive of sustainable development,80 the structure of the Uruguay
Round in larger form and composition is basically the same as the
GATT and other free trade agreements. That is, the GATT/WTO rules
are designed to encourage deregulated markets through the removal of
national measures that impede trade: first tariffs, and then other nontariff barriers such as environmental regulations that restrict market
access for beef and gasoline, to choose two recent examples. The
GATT/WTO system is a regime consisting of primarily "negative"
obligations in which states agree to refrain from taking actions, such as
imposing certain tariffs, that could impede market access. For this
reason, the international trade regime can define sustainability in only
the most simplistic syllogism: deregulated markets promote trade, trade
generates wealth, and wealthier countries have more resources to deploy
for realizing environmental protection and other public welfare goals.
Runge, the economist, rejects this chain of reasoning, arguing instead
that "trade rules alone are inadequate to the task: environmental rules
are also required." 8'
Runge's statement is self-evident if one interprets "trade rules"
strictly as "rules that promote deregulation." Likewise, Vogel states that
"[t]he greater the commitment to economic integration, the more trade
agreements will intrude upon domestic policies." 2 This too is only true
to the extent that "economic integration" is equated with "deregulated
trade." As a consequence of these and similar outlooks, all of these
books in essence are confined to discussions of limits to deregulation
because of concern for environmental and public health values.

79. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, pmbl.

para. 1, 33 I.L.M. 13, 15 (1994). The name given to the organization during negotiations,
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), was changed to World Trade Organization (WTO) at
the time the agreement was signed. Id. at 13 n.l.
80. Cameron & Ward, supra note 72, at 103.
81. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 95; cf. Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth,
Carrying Capacity, and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE 520 (1995).

82.

VOGEL, supra note 4, at 9.
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It may be heresy from the point of view of trade policy, but from
the perspective of sustainability the GATT/WTO's one-size-fits-all
deregulatory approach may not be appropriate for all trade. It is entirely
reasonable to ask what kind of trade, on what terms, will minimize
adverse environmental impacts and encourage environmental conservation and sustainable development. Runge, for example, compellingly
argues that protectionist elements in the EU's Common Agricultural
Policy have exacerbated environmental degradation,83 and that trade
liberalization in the traditional, deregulatory sense might very well be an
appropriate policy, response. This may be a situation in which trade
liberalization can improve environmental quality, maximize social
utility, and contribute to the imperative for sustainable development by
discouraging overexploitation or inefficient use of natural resources,
particularly through the removal of environmentally inappropriate subsidies.
At the same time, it is by no means apparent that a deregulated or
unregulated market is sustainable for all forms of international trade. As
Runge among these authors most clearly recognizes, such a view is
nothing short of Panglossian. Such international agreements as those
governing trade in hazardous wastes 4 and endangered species 5 are most
certainly trade agreements and arguably "sustainable trade" agreements,
although clearly not "free trade" agreements as that term is ordinarily
used. Through this lens, the treatment of multilateral environmental
agreements, which causes each of the authors to go through complex
analytical contortions, becomes much simpler. Presumably, these agreements were motivated by a recognition that unrestricted trade in these
sectors is presumptively unsustainable, that trade presents unusual
environmental, public health, and trade problems, and that affirmative
regulation of such trade is therefore required.
Similarly, the very notion of "sustainable development" raises the
question whether certain forms of environmental regulation should be
encouraged by the international trade regime, as opposed to merely
tolerated. One could imagine a variety of incentives and disincentives taxes, subsidies, border fees, standards for imports and exports, consumer information, foreign aid, and expanded market access in return
for improved environmental performance - crafted so as to encourage
more environmentally sustainable development. Instead, one of the more
pressing problems currently in the trade-and-environment area,

83. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
84. Basel Convention, supra note 50.
85. CITES, supra note 49.
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"ecolabelling" to alert consumers to products manufactured in a more
environmentally sensitive manner, is emblematic of the manner in which
international trade rules currently operate. Some of the schemes that
have caused concern are voluntary as opposed to mandatory, and labelling in general, by addressing only the transmission of information, is
already one of the least burdensome forms of regulation. None of this
has prevented ecolabelling schemes from becoming a major flash point
in the current debate.86
The conventional wisdom is that well-meaning attempts to interfere
with the free flow of goods in such environmentally sensitive sectors as
tropical timber will only backfire, exacerbating inefficiencies in the
allocation of resources. A number of the authors disapprovingly refer to
Austrian legislation addressing imports of tropical timber.8 7 This example is particularly noteworthy, because the weakness may have been an
excessively narrow focus on one aspect of the problem of deforestation,
namely market access, by one country acting unilaterally. A more comprehensive, multilateral undertaking that identified the needs of tropical
countries and responded with an appropriate mix of rules and incentives,
as advocated by the economist Edward Barbier in Trade and the Environment,88 might have been more successful. Such an initiative could
also be a vehicle for addressing overconsumption in industrialized
countries, a constant refrain voiced by representatives of developing
country governments as a precondition to their acceptance of additional
international environmental obligations. But as currently structured, the
international trade regime also encourages overdependence of the South
countries on the North's export markets, a phenomenon which tends to
dampen any serious multilateral effort to address this problem. Tellingly,
there have been few if any serious attempts to grapple with these questions in a meaningful, way.
In short, deregulation, the natural endpoint of free trade agreements,
is not necessarily a vehicle for promoting environmentally sustainable
development. To the contrary, unregulated markets have generally been
rejected as a mechanism for pursuing environmental quality improvements. This is the point that Runge makes clearly and forcefully, although in somewhat different words. It is hardly a shocking proposition,

86. See, e.g., WTO Trade and Environment Committee Agrees on Work Programme in
Preparationfor the Singapore MinisterialMeeting, at 6, WTO Doc. PRESS/TE 006 (Dec. 8,
1995).
87. ESTY, supra note 8, at 189; VOGEL, supra note 4, at 129-30.
88. Edward B. Barbier, The Role of Trade Interventions in the Sustainable Management
of Key Resources: The Cases of African Elephant Ivory and Tropical Timber, in I TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 436, 450..
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as the need for regulatory interventions to respond to market failures has
been well recognized on the international level for some time. For
example, a 1972 recommendation of the OECD plainly states that:
Environmental resources are in general limited and their use in
production and consumption activities may lead to their deterioration. When the cost of this deterioration is not adequately taken
into account in the price system, the market fails to reflect the
scarcity of such resources both at the national and international
levels. Public measures are thus necessary to reduce pollution and
to reach a better allocation of resources by ensuring that prices of
goods depending on the quality and/or quantity of environmental
resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity and that economic agents concerned react accordingly.89
"Ensuring that prices of goods depending on the quality and/or quantity
of environmental resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity" 9
is the exhortation, contained in the polluter-pays principle, that encourages cost internalization as at least a first step toward assuring environmental quality.
Not coincidentally, Esty repeatedly identifies cost internalization as
one, if not the only, requirement of sufficient generality in the environmental field to act as a counterweight to the basic trade rules specifying
the most-favored-nation treatment, the requirements for national treatment, and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions. 9' Unfortunately,
Esty does not carry the insight to its logical conclusion. Cost internalization and the polluter-pays 'principle are not only entirely consistent with
the goals of liberalized trade, but are affirmative mechanisms to "avoid
distortions in international trade and investment[.]" 9 2 Current
GATT/WTO rules allow application of the polluter-pays principle as
well as implementation of requirements for cost internalization as domestic environmental measures,93 but they do not seem to authorize the

89. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental
Policies, Annex 2, OECD Doc. C(72)128 (May 26, 1972), reprinted in ORGANIZATION FOR
FcON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 23, 24 (1986).

90. Id.
91. ESTY, supra note 8, at 38, 176-78, 226-27.
92. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental
Policies, supra note 89, Annex 4; see generally David A. Wirth, The InternationalTrade
Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1389, 1398-401 (1992).
. 93. United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT Doc.
L/6175, paras. 5.2.3-5.2.7 (June 17, 1987) (discussing polluter-pays principle), in BISD 136
(34th Supp. 1988), reprintedin 27 I.L.M. 1601, 1613-14 (1988).
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enforcement of such standards with respect to environmental effects in
the country of export. If cost internalization should be a condition precedent to entry into commerce on the national level, the same considerations counsel the adoption of a similar standard for access to the international marketplace created by the WTO instruments and other free
trade agreements. With an affirmative requirement for cost internalization contained in WTO instruments, for example, the international trade
regime could truly promote sustainable trade and environmental protection simultaneously. The practical impediments to realizing such a goal
should not be understated. But as noted above, the door has already
been opened to the inclusion of affirmative obligations into trade agreements in the form of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round.
To paraphrase Vogel's ultimate conclusion, what would appear to be
lacking is political will.
As noted in the foreword to the Runge book, "The final chapters of
the ongoing trade-environment debate have not been written. 94 In its
way, each of these works adds another chapter to that public policy
discussion by fully engaging the reader, both intellectually and analytically, in a challenging area where there is much more work still to be
done. The field is so rich that it is probably unrealistic to expect a fully
rounded treatment in any one work. As demonstrated by the wide variety of backgrounds of these writers, the trade-and-environment area can
be approached from any number of fields and benefits particularly from
a multidisciplinary approach. To appreciate the many facets of this gem,
one should not rely on any one discipline or, indeed, any one author.

94. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at viii.

